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PORTAGE STRATEGIES FOR ADAPTING
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
DURING A LOGJAM ERA
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The topic assigned to me was "How we got into the logjam,
why it hurts the environment, business, and the public generally,
and how to get out of it."
I argue that there is indeed a "logjam" in federal
environmental politics today, as majorities in both political parties
have degenerated into a "blood feud" in which they would rather
have an environmental issue than a compromise that results in
legislation to solve environmental problems. I contrast recent
events in Washington with those of a healthier time in the late
1980s and early 1990s when I served as General Counsel of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during passage of the
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, one of the last pieces of
significant environmental legislation. that Congress has passed
successfully.
Many are hopeful that the 2008 presidential election may
change the current poisonous dynamic in Washington and restore
bi-partisan compromise, and with it the renewed prospect of
Congress taking an active role in making environmental policies. I
too am hopeful, but I am also skeptical that either an Obama or
McCain Administration can actually "break" the logjam, as its
causes are deep in the nature of modem American politics.
Therefore, I explore the possibilities of what I call "portage
strategies" for going around the logjam in Congress on
environmental policy-making. By "portage strategies" I mean
law-making techniques for adapting environmental policy to new
problems and changing realities without legislation in an era in
which Congress is paralyzed. I argue that courts should give
agencies increased leeway to adapt existing statutes to new
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challenges in recognition of the practical reality that Congress in
our era is paralyzed by partisanship from enacting or modifying
existing environmental legislation except in the unusual
circumstances of a perceived crisis. As I explain near the end of
the paper, among other things, courts should construe the Chevron
doctrine functionally, rather than literally, to give agencies
increased authority to interpret their statutes creatively to deal with
new problems. Courts should sometimes preclude agencies from
interpreting statutes creatively, but only if Congress has actually
made a decision to preclude a possible interpretation. Courts
should not stand in the way of agencies adapting their statutes
creatively to emerging problems by seizing on bits and pieces of
language or legislative history to preclude policies that Congress
never considered one way or the other. Chevron vindicates
Congress's power to decide issues in ways that bind both courts
and agencies; the Chevron doctrine was never intended to preclude
policies that Congress had not considered one way or another
based on tortured readings by judges of language that is irrelevant
to the current issue because Congress did not have it in mind.
Congressional paralysis and increasing literalism by the courts
in applying the Chevron doctrine have created a dilemma in which
administrative agencies are tasked with solving emerging problems
without legislative guidance, but are simultaneously denied the
tools of flexible statutory interpretation that they need to do the
job. A paradigmatic example of the schizophrenic signals now
coming out of the courts is the conflict between the Massachusetts
v. EPA1 decision by the Supreme Court and the North Carolina
decision 2 by the D.C. Circuit on the Clean Air Interstate Rule
(CAIR).3  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the Bush Administration's argument that
1 Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
2 North Carolina v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(invalidating the "Clean Air Interstate Rule," infra note 3). On September 25,
2008, EPA filed a Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc of the panel
decision. Government Files Petition for Rehearing in CAIR Case, CLIMATE
INTEL, Sept. 26, 2008, http://climateintel.com/2008/09/26/government-files-
petition-for-rehearing-in-cair-case/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2008). Congress is also
considering legislation to overturn the decision and reinstate the rule.
3 The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12,
2005).
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addressing global climate change should await new legislation.4
But in the CAIR decision, the D.C. Circuit denied EPA the
flexibility to interpret existing law to impose a "cap and trade"
program, which is one of the principal tools for regulating
greenhouse gases (GHGs).5  The courts cannot have it both
ways-unless perhaps their goal is to create such a crisis in
environmental policy that Congress will be forced to step in to
straighten out the mess. Instead, courts should allow agencies
interpretive flexibility to adapt existing statutes to new problems
except when Congress has actually focused on the issue and
precluded the agency initiative in question.
The final "portage strategy" that I describe at the end of the
paper, "expert consensus proposal systems," is the one that I
consider the most promising, for the reasons that I describe.
"Expert consensus proposal systems" are promising for several
different reasons but a principal one is their incentive structure
inherently promotes compromise. Since they have no power but
the power to persuade, expert consensus panels can only expect to
exercise influence if they actually come together to reach
agreement, unlike political officials who can gain political
advantage by disagreeing publicly. In normal times when there is
no perceived crisis that forces compromise, politicians often prefer
to define the contrast between themselves and their opponents by
adopting extreme positions that send symbolically satisfying
signals to an external audience. This phenomenon becomes even
more pronounced as an area of law matures, and the issues become
more complicated and less susceptible to simple moralistic
solutions that command bipartisan support, such as "beginning...
to move on the problems of clean air and clean water and open
4 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497.
5 There is a voluminous literature on the design of "cap and trade" programs
to regulate GHGs. See, e.g. Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L. J. 677 (1999).
EPA's "advance notice of proposed rulemaking" on regulating GHGs under the
existing Clean Air Act also discusses the pros and cons of "cap and trade"
programs at length. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under. the Clean
Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44353 (July 30, 2008). The point for present purposes is
not whether "cap and trade" is or is not the optimal policy instrument, but rather
that the D.C.Circuit opinion has at a minimum cast serious doubt on EPA's
authority to use one of the leading tools that had been thought available to
regulate GHGs.
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spaces for the future generations of America." 6 In times of crisis
(or perceived crisis), this normal political dynamic may change
briefly as public attention is focused on the subject, but these
"republican moments" are few and far between. 7 To counter-act
the tendency of politicians to act like politicians when dealing with
complex issues, many areas of law benefit from expert consensus
proposal systems; two good examples are the non-binding
Restatements issued by the American Law Institute, and the
resolutions passed by the American Bar Association.
Environmental law is conspicuous as one of the few complex but
important bodies of law where no expert proposal system has yet
emerged.
No one thinks that such "portage strategies" are a complete
solution to everything that ails our environmental policies, but they
can do a lot to adapt environmental law to meet new challenges in
the absence of legislation.8 In what follows, I first describe the
"logjam," and then describe how courts should give agencies more
leeway to interpret statutes creatively during an era in which
environmental legislation is more theoretical than practical, and
finally turn to "expert consensus proposal systems" at the end.
I. DESCRIBING THE "LOGJAM"
Let us turn first to describing the "logjam." It is not entirely
clear to me exactly what "logs" are supposedly "jammed." Does
6 President Richard M. Nixon, Remarks on Signing the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970 (Dec. 31, 1970), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2874.
7 See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lecture: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 Yale L. J. 1013 (1984).
8 At the Breaking the Logjam Symposium, David Buente rightly pointed out
that bringing China into an international regime to regulate greenhouse gases
could be seen as one of the leading environmental problems of the day, and he
wondered aloud how "portage approaches" could address that issue. An
Executive Agreement, rather than a treaty, would be a "portage approach" as I
have defined the term for reaching an international agreement on GHGs in that,
unlike a treaty, it does not require approval by super-majorities in Congress. See
generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, Is NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL?
(Harvard Univ. Press 1995). In that same way the partisan paralysis has made it
more difficult to ratify treaties, and that reality has in turn led to the rise of
Executive Agreements, I argue that other institutions of lawmaking, such as
administrative creative interpretation of statutes must take up the slack for a
Congress that is paralyzed by a partisan logjam.
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this metaphor refer to the fact that we have not passed any major
new environmental legislation at the federal level in the eighteen
years since the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act? Or is
merely a reflection of the frustration that many feel about the Bush
Administration's policies on climate change? Or is it a broader
concern that we have lost our "lead" to the Europeans,9 who with
their new REACH program as well as the Kyoto Protocol,
arguably now have more stringent and costly environmental
legislation that we do? It is not intuitively apparent to me that the
government that governs most necessarily governs best, nor that
the burden and expense that environmental law imposes on the
economy is necessarily the best measure of who is "ahead."' 10
But certainly some things are very wrong with the way that
politics, including environmental politics, is conducted in
Washington today. Two examples from my personal experience
are symptomatic of the most significant major trend in my
judgment, which is for good policy to take a back seat to posturing
for political advantage on both sides of the aisle.
The first example of policy considerations getting lost in the
political shuffle is EPA cabinet status. I have testified on several
separate occasions in support of elevating EPA to cabinet status."
When the Republicans are in the White House, the Democrats
oppose it; when the Democrats are in the White House, the
Republicans oppose it. Neither side actually appears to care much
about the merits of the issue. Both are simply determined not to
allow a President of the opposite political party to get "credit" for
9 See Jonathan B. Wiener, A Pattern of Parity and Particularity, THE ENVTL
FORUM 52 (2006).
'0 Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Precautionary Regulation of Chemicals
in the US and EU, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK
REGULATION IN THE US AND EUROPE (Jonathan Wiener, Michael Rogers, Jim
Hammitt & Peter Sand eds., forthcoming) (arguing that performance in
restricting dangerous substances should be the measure of policy and questioning
whether there are actually significant differences in the degree to which
European and U.S. systems of chemical regulation have allowed dangerous
substances onto the market).
" See A Bill to Elevate the EPA to a Cabinet Level Department: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, S. 159, 107th Cong. (2001)
(testimony of E. Donald Elliott); EPA Cabinet Elevation: Hearing on H.R. 37
and H.R. 2138 Before the H. Subcomm. On Energy Policy, Natural Resources
and Regulatory Affairs Comm. On Government Reform, 108th Cong. (2003)
(testimony of E. Donald Elliott).
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elevating EPA to cabinet status. One could make arguments that
elevating EPA to cabinet status is bad policy, or that it will not
matter much either way. My point, however, is that the merits of
the argument have become entirely irrelevant. It is all just about
politics.
A second example involves proposed legislation to implement
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPs), the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)
POPs Protocol, and the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed
Consent. After years of being criticized as an international outlaw
for not ratifying the international treaties banning POPs-all of
which are already banned under U.S. law anyway-the Bush
Administration finally submitted the Stockholm treaty on POPs for
ratification. Congress refused to pass the necessary implementing
legislation, however. The "issue" that proved intractable for the
politicians and their staffs was whether the standard for judicial
review for hypothetically adding new chemicals to the list at some
point in the future should be "capricious and arbitrary" or
"substantial evidence."
Among others, I carefully explained to the leading staffers for
both the Democrats and the Republicans 12 that according to Justice
Scalia, most administrative law treatises, and my own experience
over 30 years as a litigator and Administrative Law professor,
there is really little or no practical difference between these two
linguistic formulas.13
12 Interestingly, the conversations that I had with the leading Republican and
Democratic staffers to try to broker a deal took place individually with me on
opposite sides of the room. I had known both the staffers for 15 years, and had
previously worked successfully with both of them. They had known one another
for almost as long, but their personal relationship was obviously strained and
each of them preferred to speak to me separately. The frayed personal
relationship between them was a vestige of past battles between the two on other
issues. The strained personal relationship between the two of them did not help,
but that was not really the fundamental problem. It became increasingly clear
that neither of them-nor their nominal bosses, members of Congress-actually
wanted to compromise. Both of them preferred to have an issue of how
unreasonable the other was being as opposed to a deal.
13 See Legislation to Implement the POPs, PIC, and LRTAP POPs
Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Hazardous
Materials of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 120-21 ((2006)
(statement of E. Donald Elliott):
3. 'Based on your experience as General Counsel of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), including your work defending EPA's
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During my testimony, I remember sitting next to Dr. Lynn
Goldman, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Public
Health, who served as the Assistant Administrator for the
Pesticides and Toxics program at EPA during the Clinton
Administration, whereas I served as General Counsel of EPA
during the first Bush Administration. Lynn and I have known one
another for over a decade and during that time, we have agreed and
disagreed with one another on various issues of public policy but
we have always had a cordial and professional relationship, and I
believe one of mutual respect, even when we disagreed. I
remember distinctly that Lynn and I looked at one another
incredulously as the members and their staffs argued about this
peripheral technicality as if the future of the republic turned on it.
We whispered to one another: "We could work out a compromise
attempt to regulate asbestos under Section 6 of TSCA, would it be
better to use an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review,
the standard that is used for most other environmental rulemakings?'
Along with most courts and commentators, I think there is no real
difference in practice between the arbitrary and capricious standard and
the substantial evidence standard. William Fox, Dean of Catholic
University Law School, explains it this way in his administrative law
treatise:
'In 1984, one of the newer members of the D.C. Circuit (now a
Supreme Court Justice), Antonin Scalia, took the bull by the horns and
decided there simply was no difference between the substantial
evidence test and the arbitrary/capicious test. Writing for the court in
Assn. of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, Federal
Reserve Sys., [745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984)] then-Judge Scalia... put
it: "[Substantial evidence] is only a specific application of
[arbitrary/capricious] separately recited in the APA not to establish a
more rigorous standard of factual support but to .emphasize that in the
case of formal proceedings, the factual support must be found in the
closed [hearing] record as opposed to elsewhere" In Scalia's opinion,
the distinction is mainly one of semantics. The touchstone for both tests
is reasonableness. The differences between the two are differences of
analytical technique rather than analytical substance. While not all
courts of appeals have adopted Justice Scalia's language, most courts
apear to accept his reasoning. At present, there seems not to be much
agonizing over the distinction between arbitrary/capricious and
substantial evidence.'
Id. See also WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 334
(4th ed. 2000).
Congress would simply be fooling itself if it thought that it would make
any real difference in practice to substitute one form of words for the other.
Today most courts equate the two standards, and my experience is that there is
little if any difference in their practical effect.
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on this in about five minutes." But that was really the point: no
one in the hearing room other than Lynn and I wanted to work out
a compromise. Neither Lynn nor I was being paid by anyone; we
were both just trying to get something sensible and reasonable
done for the environment, but the politicians and their staffs on
both sides of the aisle were having none of it. They wanted an
issue, not a deal.
In response to my vain attempts to broker a compromise, both
Republican and Democratic staffers patiently explained to me that
while my compromise formulas might work, it really was not
about this particular issue. It was really retaliation for the other's
unreasonable behavior on the last issue that they had had to deal
with together. Here in microcosm we have the logic of the classic
"blood feud"14-the Hatfields and the McCoys-where both sides
lose perspective because over time it has become "about"
something larger than the immediate issue. Both sides preferred to
have an "issue" that they could use with their constituency to
portray the other side as unreasonable rather than a compromise.
The key dynamic comes down to politicians and their staffs
gravitating to extreme positions to define the contrast between
them in symbolic terms for an external audience that is not well-
informed about the specifics of complicated issues, rather than
moving to the center to achieve a compromise. This has been true
for environmental issues large and small for many years now in
Washington. A decade ago two experienced and insightful players
in the Washington environmental policy scene described this
political dynamic on environmental issues as "the politics of the
extremes":
Given the crying need for reform, why did... Superfund
reform fail once again? An examination of some of the major
issues addressed in the legislation suggests that the politics of
the extremes killed the bill. On the left, critics charged that the
Republican-sponsored bill would "let polluters off the hook."
On the right, there were complaints that the bill "didn't go far
enough" to remedy the core deficiencies in the law to warrant
reinstating the taxes that provide the monies for Superfund
14 For a review of the voluminous literature on "blood feuds" in general, and
Max Weber's and Emile Durkheim's theories on blood feuds in particular, see
Jonas Grutzpalk, Blood Feud and Modernity., 2 J. CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY 115
(2002).
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which lapsed in 1995. Both sets of critics argued that we would
be better off with no legislation.15
While Klee and Rosenberg in 1999 focused on the then-recent
failure of Superfund reform efforts in the 10 5th Congress as "a
good case study on legislative impasse," 16 they were also
describing a broader phenomenon: "For the past seven years,
Congress has tried, and failed, to move major pieces of
environmental legislation to overhaul the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species
Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). ' ' 7
Unfortunately, except in times of perceived crisis in a particular
area of policy, "the politics of the extremes" often are the norm. It
comes down to both sides deciding that they prefer having an issue
to having a bill.
Another good example of politicians preferring an issue to a
compromise relates to the several "multi-pollutant" bills that were
pending before Congress to amend the Clean Air Act from 2003 to
2005. There clearly was a compromise to be had, if people on
both sides of the aisle had wanted one. The Republican version
(The Clear Skies Act) proposed a trading system to get 70%
reductions in three pollutants; the Democratic version (The Clean
Power Act) proposed a trading system to get 90% reductions in
four pollutants.1 8  The compromise possibilities were obvious:
perhaps an 80% reduction plus a study or other modest first steps
on the fourth pollutant (CO2) where there was a real lack of
agreement.
15 Ann R. Klee & Ernie Rosenberg, The Moribund State of CERCLA
Reauthorization, 13 NATURAL RES. & ENv'T 451 (1999). At the time the article
appeared, Klee was chief counsel to the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works. She went on to serve as EPA General Counsel under President
George W. Bush, and is now Vice President of Corporate Environmental
Programs at General Electric. Rosenberg previously served in several staff
positions at EPA, and was Vice President for Health, Environment and Safety of
Occidental International at the time that the article appeared. He is now
President of the Soap and Detergent Association.
16 Id. at451.
17 Id.
18 The various bills are summarized in C.V. Mathai and E. Donald Elliott,
The Clear Skies Initiative: Multipollutant Legislation for the Electric Power
Generation Industry, EM, 25 (2002) (EM is the Air & Waste Management
Association's Magazine for Environmental Managers).
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This was the kind of deal that Senator Edmund Muskie, the
primary architect of many of our environmental laws, always
made.' 9 Get what you can get enacted now, he would say, and
then come back two years later for the rest, which he did
successfully again and again. I spoke to many environmentalists
about the possibility of a compromise deal at the time, and they did
not deny that compromise legislation was doable. They simply
decided that they did not want to compromise for what was
attainable at the time. They preferred to have the "issue" for the
next election, rather than a compromise statute that could be
enacted. And some of them admitted as much publicly.
Another indicator of how "dug in" both sides have become is
the rhetoric. The politicization of environmental issues has gotten
so bad that when a Republican Administration tightens air
pollution rules set by its predecessors it is roundly criticized for
weakening them on the grounds that it could have tightened them
even more, 20 a linguistic feat that would make George Orwell
proud!
Moreover, it is now routine in Washington in my experience
that arguments like those that Lynn Goldman and I were making at
the hearing on implementing the POPs and PICs treaties are
dismissed as "good government arguments." This is not praise,
but a pejorative term, by which is meant that these arguments are
naive, academic, inadmissible, and irrelevant, i.e., ones that serious
political actors should not even bother to consider. In fact,
arguments about good policy and those who advance them are
sometimes dismissed as "goo goos, ' ' 2' a term whose juvenile
overtones suggest that those who care about good public policy are
terminally jejune. There was a time within my memory when
good policy was viewed as the primary goal and politics as the
constraint. But today in Washington it is all about "environmental
'9 For a review of Senator Muskie's career that emphasizes his willingness to
compromise when necessary to get legislation passed, see THEO LIPPMAN AND
DONALD HANSEN, MUSKIE (W. W. Norton and Company 1971).
20 Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules Weakened at Bush's Behest: EPA Scrambles
To Justify Action, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2008, at Al (reporting on an EPA
proposal to lower the ozone standard, set at 80 parts per billion in 1997 during
the Clinton Administration, to 75 parts per billion).
21 WLKIPEDIA, Goo-GOOs, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goo-goos (last visited
Sept. 9, 2008) ("In American politics, the term is still used occasionally as a
mildly derisive label for highminded citizens or reformers.").
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politics," not "environmental policy."
For perspective, contrast the situation that I have described
above with the speech delivered by the first President Bush on July
21, 1989, when he invited environmentalists as well as prominent
Democrats to the Rose Garden to announce the proposals that
ultimately became the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990:
Welcome to the steamy Rose Garden, Mr. Speaker and
distinguished Members of the Congress.
Something that was truly striking during my recent travels in
Europe was this genuine excitement and enthusiasm spreading
about the environmental issues. And the economic summit in
Paris was largely devoted to the environment and what it means
for the quality of life on our planet. Our neighbors abroad feel
a sense of shared commitment. They're cooperating to find
solutions, and we're working very closely with them.
Around the world, in efforts to clean up the environment, we,
the United States of America, are taking the lead. And the next
step now is congressional action. And let me make one thing
very, very clear: Clean air is too important to be a partisan
issue. Anyone who allows political bickering to weaken our
progress against pollution does a tragic disservice to every city
in America and to every American in this country who wants
and deserves clean air. And we've worked very hard on both
sides of the aisle to craft a proposal that, for the first time in
two decades, makes new progress for clean air.
The Clean Air Act that I'm sending to Congress today has been
made possible thanks to the outstanding efforts and the
bipartisan support of Republicans and Democrats alike.
Protecting the world's shared natural heritage must be a global,
universal priority. Just as environmental problems respect no
borders, our solutions must transcend political boundaries. And
that's why we're here today, and that's why this legislation is
such good news: It brings us one step closer towards clean air.
The reforms we're proposing to the Clean Air Act represent
thousands of hours of careful analysis, negotiation, and
cooperation.... In drafting this legislation, we've reached out.
We've heard from groups all across the spectrum, and we've
listened to, appreciated, and certainly benefited from their
comments. Environmentalists, industry leaders, Members of
Congress, experts from the science and academic area-leaders
from every quarter have all shown the wisdom and will to make
clean air the birthright of every American.
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I am pleased and proud to see that many of you have decided to
cosponsor this bill. and I can't thank you all enough, because
clean air, once again, is a bipartisan issue. I've requested
Senators Burdick [D] and Chafee [R] and Congressmen Dingell
[D] and Lent [R]-Norm-to be the bill's prime sponsors, and
if this bill becomes law, all of you will have earned the
gratitude and respect of generations to come.
22
The bipartisan tone of the President's remarks in 1989 is
conspicuous by its absence from more recent public statements
about the environment on both sides of the aisle. It is also
remarkable, and more than merely symbolic, that the
Administration bill was introduced by a leading Democrat as well
as a Republican in each house of Congress. Susan L. Mayer of the
Congressional Research Service, credits this statement by the first
President Bush with "breaking the stalemate" 23 that had prevented
clean air legislation during the 1980s. That's close enough to
"breaking the logjam" to be of interest, but she also goes on to note
that significant "negotiations" and "revisions" '24 (i.e., compromise)
occurred between President's Bush initial proposal in July 1989
and final enactment more than a year later in November 1990.
There is no question that presidential leadership is very
important in securing the enactment of environmental legislation.
But presidential leadership alone is clearly not sufficient, or we
would have had revisions to the Clean Air Act under the second
President Bush, when the Administration had its own proposals for
amending the Clean Air Act, the so-called "Clear Skies Act of
2003,''25 as well as Republican majorities in both houses of
22 PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH, REMARKS ON TRANSMITTING TO THE
CONGRESS PROPOSED LEGISLATION To AMEND THE CLEAN AIR ACT (July 21,
1989), available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?
id=718&year= 1 989&month=7.
23 Susan L. Mayer, CRS Report: 95-234 Implementing the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990: Where Are We Now? 3 (1995), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Air/air-9.cfm ("During the 1980s,
no further amendments were enacted despite many proposals both to strengthen
the Act... and to reduce its regulatory burden by curtailing requirements or
extending deadlines. This stalemate was broken on July 21, 1989, when
President Bush proposed comprehensive amendments to the CAA. Following
extended debates, negotiations, and revisions of language, P.L. 101-549 was
signed on November 15, 1990.") (emphasis added).
24 Id.
25 Introduced, in February 2003 as S. 485 and H.R. 999 in March 2005, the
bill died in committee on a deadlocked 9-9 vote. Seven Democrats, plus James
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Congress for a portion of his term. Successful environmental
legislation also requires the kind of negotiations and compromise
that occurred over the fifteen months after the first President Bush
announced his proposals in the summer of 1989, and that is what
has been lacking over the last decade.
While there is some casual evidence that compromise
legislation may be less frequent today than in the past,26 the
poisonous political climate in Washington is not totally preventing
Congress from passing compromise legislation in other areas.
Since September 11, 2001, Congress has passed no less than eight
major statutes dealing with terrorism and homeland security,27 and
it recently enacted the $700 billion economic Rescue Package.
What is clear, however, is that Congress is passing fewer
environmental laws in recent years than in the 1970s and 1980s.
Environmental law was in its formative period in the 1970s
and 1980s as the basic design of the system was put in place, and
the goals and institutions of environmental law were gradually
worked out. Many prominent environmental lawyers and
academics grew up in that period and it somehow seems
unfortunate to us that environmental law is no longer center stage
in the Congress. We yearn for a return of the glory days of 1990,
when we tied up the Congress for the better part of a year working
out the details of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
Jeffords (I) of Vermont, and Lincoln Chafee (R) of Rhode Island voted against
the bill; nine Republicans supported it. See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003 (2006), http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/
fact2003.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
26 Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Deal Spotlights Rarity of Bipartisan
Action: Some See Chance for More of the Same, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2008, at
A1O.27 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007); Post Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006)
(part of an Omnibus spending bill; based on S. 3721); Security and
Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884
(2006); USA PATRIOT Improvement And Reauthorization Act Of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-408, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004); Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064
(2002); Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001); USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
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However, frequent legislation is not desirable in and of itself. We
should think of legislation as we do amendments to the
Constitution. Legislation indicates that something major has gone
wrong with the existing system of laws and needs to be fixed, or
that circumstances have changed and that we need to adapt the
system to new realities that the framers did not anticipate.
When things are running badly, but tolerably badly, legal
change may happen but legislation does not. Legislation is a last
resort because it requires compromise. Or as the late Israeli
foreign minister, Abba Eban, put it somewhat more pungently,
"History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they
have exhausted all other alternatives." 28 In an article that I co-
authored with Bruce Ackerman and John Millian some years ago,
we pointed out that passing environmental legislation requires that
a majority of the players abandon their first-best preferences and
settle for their second- or third-best.2 9 This generally requires an
actual or perceived crisis that changes the dynamic of "politics as
usual" by focusing public attention on the issue and temporarily
forcing members of Congress to put aside their usual political
motivations.
In a sense, then, environmental law has been a victim of its
own success. Our area is no longer in a crisis (or perceived crisis)
that causes it to take priority over other more pressing national
problems such as terrorism and the financial crisis-as it once was
when the Cuyahoga River caught fire, Kepone poisoned the James
River, children in the inner city suffered retardation from lead in
gasoline, and we believed that PCBs and other chlorinated
organics were causing wide-spread sterility in the animal kingdom
and otherwise destroying nature.
Climate change is the arena of environmental policy today
that comes closest to a crisis that engages public attention. It is not
surprising, therefore, that it is also the area in which new
environmental legislation seems most likely. But much to the
28 WIKIPEDIA, ABBA EBAN, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Abba Eban (last
visited Sept. 30, 2008). See also another aphorism attributed to Abba Eban, "It's
not that Governments are constitutionally incapable of making the right decision,
it's that they only do so as a matter of last resort." Id.
29 E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.
LAW, ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
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chagrin of many environmental specialists, according to the polls,
even climate change is far down the priority list on the public's
agenda. 30 And even if some legislation to address climate change
is enacted in the next Administration (as it probably will be), I am
skeptical about how broadly the "radiative forcing" of climate
change legislation will extend to other environmental programs.31
So I do not believe that "the logjam" will be broken any time soon,
or that we can count on new legislation to reform environmental
law or adapt it to new conditions.
II. WHAT IF WE CANNOT "BREAK" THE LOGJAM?
Here I want to make a classic Yale Law School move to meta-
analysis. I have a long-standing interest in the relationship
between naturalistic metaphors and environmental law. 32  So I
want to take seriously the metaphor that today there is a political
"logjam" in Washington, and to ask what those of us who are
serious about good and sensible policies to protect the environment
should do about it. As a nature lover and canoeist, I do know from
personal experience what one actually does when confronted with
a real logjam. As in many other situations, how nature works can
teach us something about how law should work.33
The preferred solution when the river is blocked by an actual
30 Andrew Freedman, Freedman: Climate Change Low on Public Agenda,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 31, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
capitalweathergang/2008/03/freedmanclimatechangelowon.html.
The American public does not view global climate change as a top tier
problem facing the country today, according to a recent Gallup poll.
The poll found that "the economy in general" topped the list, followed
by the Iraq War and about two dozen other issues ... Only one percent
out of the 1,012 American adults surveyed said that the
environment/pollution is the country's most important problem.
31 Jonathan Weiner, Radiative Forcing Climate Policy to Break the Logjam
in Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210 (2008).
32 See generally E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENV'T POL'Y 170 (Marian
Chertow and Daniel Esty eds., Yale Univ. Press, 1997); E. Donald Elliott, The
Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and
Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 17 (2001); E. Donald Elliott, Foreword-
A New Style of Ecological Thinking in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1 (1991).
13 Elsewhere I call this the "biomimetic" approach when law mimics nature.
E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J.
595, 600 (1997).
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logjam made of real logs is actually not to try to "break" it in most
instances. That only works if the logjam consists merely of a few
puny branches that have gotten tangled up in the current. The
logjam in Washington is a lot more substantial and fundamental
than that. If everyone who attended the Symposium agreed on
exactly how to "break the logjam"-and the chances of that are, of
course, non-existent-and if we all devoted all of our energy and
power to doing so, we would be incapable of reforming our
politics in the environmental area so that politicians care more
about getting the issues right than posturing and embarrassing the
other side to "energize their base."
We cannot break the logjam in environmental politics because
the logjam is caused by forces in our politics that are larger and
more fundamental than disagreements about what constitutes good
environmental policy. They have to do with historical forces like
the disputed election of 2000, the war in Iraq, the Clinton
impeachment, the Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas hearings, as
well as important structural changes such as exempting
independent issue groups like the Swift Boat Veterans from
iampaign financing limits, the rise of "single issue" interest groups
that have little incentive to compromise on "their" issue,34 and the
increasing frequency of filibusters in the U.S. Senate, so that today
60 votes are required to pass ordinary legislation.35
I do not believe that the dysfunctional dynamic between the
two parties is likely to be "broken" any time soon. Those who
really believe that a Barack Obama or a John McCain is going to
become a transformative leader who can win the support of an
aroused American public to change the way that business is done
34 ROBERT A. HEINEMAN, STEVEN A. PETERSON & THOMAS H. RASMUSSEN,
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 145 (1995) ("Single-issue interest groups... make
compromise on issues more difficult."). See generally Gloria Toivola Oberstar,
Strategies of Single-Issue Interest Groups, 11 POL'Y STUDIES JOURNAL 616
(1983).
" David Herszenhom, How the Filibuster Became the Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2OO7/12/O2/weekinreview/
02herszenhom.html. ("So far in this first year of the 110th Congress, there have
been 72 motions to stop filibusters, most on the Iraq war but also on routine
issues like reauthorizing Amtrak funding. There were sixty-eight such motions in
the full two years of the previous Congress, fifty-three in 1987-1988 and twenty-
three in 1977-1978. In 1967-1968, there were five such votes, one of them on a
plan to amend cloture itself, which failed. For policy making, this is the
legislative equivalent of gum on a shoe.")
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in Washington may have a different approach. But I am skeptical
that even a charismatic president who means well can break the
logjam in Washington.
So I propose that a different strategy is required now than
during the formative period of environmental law. In the "good
old days" of the 1970s, a political competition between the two
parties fueled a process of ambitious, aspirational environmental
legislation. 36 I do not see that dynamic returning any time soon, in
part because Republicans have concluded (rightly or wrongly) that
they cannot win the support of environmentalists no matter what
they do, so they have stopped trying to "compete" politically.
Correct or not, this was the lesson that the current President Bush
and his closest advisers drew from the fact that environmentalists
uniformly opposed his father's re-election in 1992, despite his
support of strong environmental policies such as the 1990 Clean
Air Act (the most expensive piece of environmental legislation in
our history) and a policy of no net loss of wetlands. George W.
Bush and Karl Rove concluded that the environment is just not an
issue that Republicans can ever win, so why keep trying? The fact
that a strong advocate for the environment such as John McCain,
who broke with his party to co-sponsor climate change legislation,
has a 2007 rating of "zero" on environmental issues (and a lifetime
rating of only 24 on a scale of 100) by the League of Conservation
Voters 37 does not bode well for a return to bipartisanship in
environmental politics.
So we are like the canoeist who is confronted with a really big
logjam. Imagine that it spans the entire river in front of you, as far
as the eye can see, and is composed of a tangled mass of huge tree
trunks from the logging operation just upstream, like this:
36 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVTL. LAW 53-54 (2004)
("[A]lmost immediately after the 1968 presidential election both parties seized
upon environmental protection as a source for political opportunism.... [B]y
late 1969 and early 1970, both the Nixon White House and the Democratic-
controlled Congress were competing for the environmental mantle."); Elliott et
al., supra note 29, at 327-28 (1985) (describing "the context of competitive
credit-claiming" among politicians as "the matrix generating the basic structure
of environmental institutions of the present day.").
37 LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, JOHN MCCAIN - POSITION SUMMARY,
http://lcv.org/obama/mccain-facts.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
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What do you do? A logjam on this scale dwarfs the personal
strength of any human being. No individual or small group can
possibly hope to break it.
There is only one sensible solution: porta e; pick up the
canoe, go around the logjam, and put the canoe back in the water.
38
III. PORTAGE STRATEGIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Like carrying the canoe around the logjam, "portage
strategies" in environmental law and policy go around the
politicians rather than through them. There are essentially four
ways that I can think of to do this:
1. Address Environmental Issues More on the State and Local
Level
We certainly have been doing that with climate change.39
And some thoughtful people think that more of U.S. environmental
law should be conducted at the local and regional level, as it is in
many other countries.
40
38 WIK1PEDIA, PORTAGE, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portage (last visited
Sept. 9, 2008) ("Portage refers to the practice of carrying a canoe or other boat
over land to avoid an obstacle on the water route (such as rapids or a waterfall in
a river), or between two bodies of water.").
39 See BARRY G. RABE, GREENHOUSE & STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE
GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE (2002); Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating
Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 54, 54-55 (2005).
40 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON:
How CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES
THE PEOPLE 8, 124-43, 181-89 (2005); see generally Henry N. Butler &
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2. Policy-Making by Default by the Courts
After over a decade of failed administrative and legislative
efforts to define the scope of wetlands that are subject to federal
permitting requirements, the issue is finally being resolved by the
Supreme Court, albeit in a way that is not generally to the liking of
many environmentalists. 41 This has been an issue on the national
scene for over 15 years since then Vice-President Dan Quayle
famously delivered himself of the common sense view in 1990 that
in order to be a considered a wetland, something ought to have to
be wet.42  In an earlier era, without a logjam, one might have
anticipated that an issue of this nature could have been the subject
of a compromise statutory solution somewhere along the way,
balancing the interests of developers and environmentalists in
some sort of accommodation. And, in fact, there were numerous
attempts to reach a compromise, including sending the issue to the
National Academy of Sciences, and drafting legislative language,
which President Clinton threatened to veto. The history is told in
the following footnote. The passage is also notable for its sadly too
typical "blood feud" rhetoric in which those on the other side are
portrayed as "ignorant," "corrupt" "hatchet men" intent only on
"gutting" environmental protection with "bogus" proposals at the
behest of "developers.
43
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23
(1996) (discussing possibility of improving environmental regulations by
reallocating authority from the federal to state governments); Richard L. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992)
(arguing that claims that federal environmental laws are required to avoid a state
competition-based "race to the bottom" are unfounded, as state regulations will
ultimately provide more desirable results than federal regulations); Richard B.
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102
YALE L.J. 2039,2083-84 (1993).
41 See United States v. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006); Solid Waste
Agency of North Cook County v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
171-74 (2001).
42 John Katko, Wetland Hydrology, FRIENDS OF WETLANDS HIGHLIGHTS, 27
(1993), available at http://www.fowl.org/PDF/bestof.pdf (including a history of
the controversy, including Quayle's statement).
43
It is understandable that persons ignorant of wetland ecology and
science (such as the members of the now-happily---defunct Quayle
Council who so blindly and simplistically sought to impose upon public
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conservation agencies the interests of the developers) would be
confounded by this hydrological criterion. What is reprehensible is the
tactic the developers used: they tried to take advantage of the general
public's ignorance when they attempted to run roughshod over these
valid scientific criteria with their scientifically bankrupt or corrupt
alternative proposals and their statements such as the former Vice-
President's that "a wetland should be wet!" Either they couldn't
understand the scientists or they refused to listen when, in 1991 and
1992, they mounted an unconscionable effort to gut scientific wetland
criteria and replace them with expedient but bogus (and therefore
environmentally disastrous) rules of their own concoction. They wanted
to define saturation as being to the surface of the soil, and to set the
time parameter to 21 consecutive days during the growing season! This
would have defined many or most remaining U.S. wetlands out of
existence. It is difficult to believe they didn't know what they were
doing; they just didn't care-despite their insistence that they are "as
concerned as the next guy about protecting wetlands." The Quayle
Council (a.k.a. the President's Council on Competitiveness) forced
these bogus proposals for revisions in the 1989 Wetlands Manual on
government agencies in 1990 by claiming that these agencies did not
provide for public input (i.e. did not allow developers to make their
case) during the process whereby the 1989 Manual technical
hydrological criteria were adopted. An earlier version of the Federal
Wetlands Manual (the 1987 version) has criteria (water must be
saturated to within 12" of the surface, for a minimum of consecutive
days that constitute 5% of the growing season) which protect fewer.
areas as jurisdictional wetlands than do the 1989 criteria but are far
more sound than the Quayle Council revision proposals. At that time
the US EPA and Army Corps of Engineers decided to use these earlier
criteria to delineate wetlands until such time as the issue was resolved
by Congress. In 1993 Congress deferred this decision until the National
Academy of Sciences did further study and reported its conclusions.
This report was issued in 1995 during the' debate on the renewal of the
Clean Water Act, and it basically upheld the protective criteria of the
1989 Manual and severely criticized the political interference by the
developers and their hatchet men in the Quayle Council and other
porcine sties in the adoption of scientific criteria (for instance, Dr.
William Sipple, the head EPA representative on the wetlands review
board, decided to resign from the board rather than participate in the
charade of what he called "bad science"). But by then the 1994
elections had given the Republicans (whose pavement-and-money
reality is blissfully and determinedly innocent of scientific knowledge)
control of the Legislature, and they chose to ignore the findings of the
NAS. President Clinton threatened to veto any version of the Clean
Water Act that gutted wetland protection, and negotiations have been
proceeding ever since. The 1996 budget bill (HR 3019), which included
the CWA reauthorization, was finally approved in May, 1996, with
most of the damaging provisions removed. But the reauthorized version
of the CWA, although passed in the House, is lying dormant in the
Senate; it may see action in 1997.
Id.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
2008]
H inOnline -- 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 43 2008-2009
N. Y U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
With some justification, Justice Scalia in Rapanos accuses
Justice Kennedy of "writing a new statute" to deal with the
problem by holding that adjacent wetlands can be regulated if a
"significant nexus" can be shown to pollution of navigable waters.
The point for the moment is not whether Justice Kennedy does or
does not go beyond a legitimate act of interpretation into the realm
of law creation. Rather, the point for the moment is merely that
when a "logjam" precludes Congress from addressing
controversial issues through compromise legislation, the courts are
the default mode for supplying an answer.
Some might even argue that this is also what happened in
Mass. v. EPA.44 With a logjam preventing the political branches
from reaching a compromise on legislation to address global
climate change, Justice Stevens famously begins his opinion by
proclaiming for a 5-4 majority that:
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided
with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two
trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into the
atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping
solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected heat....
Calling global warming 'the most pressing environmental
challenge of our time'
45
I suspect that Justice Stevens chose those opening words with
great care, and that from the standpoint of history, they will be
regarded as far more important than any of the various legal
holdings that follow.
Again, my point at the moment is not to suggest that the
Supreme Court in either Mass. v. EPA or in Rapanos went beyond
its proper judicial role, but rather to make the more modest point
that the "legal system" is in fact a system. When one portion of it
is not functioning as effectively as it once did due to a "logjam,"
other portions of the system of necessity have a tendency to take
up the slack by adapting and supplying answers to pressing legal
questions that might formerly have come through legislation.
44 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).41 Id. at 497.
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3. Use the Chevron Doctrine to Develop Innovative Policies
Under Existing Statutes
Elsewhere I have argued at length, and so will not repeat here,
that the Chevron doctrine has made environmental legislation
somewhat less necessary:
Chevron rendered the legal system more adaptable and more
capable of undergoing substantial policy changes without the
benefit of legislation. One might even speculate that the
increased ability of the law-making system to adapt to new
conditions without legislation may in turn help to account for
the relative paucity of significant environmental legislation
since 1990.46
Although there has not been much significant environmental
legislation since 1990, environmental policies have continued to
develop and change. Emboldened by the Chevron doctrine,
47
administrative decision-makers have been able to adapt the system
by making significant policy changes that previously would have
been thought to require legislation. Two examples are the
"brownfields" reform of the Superfund program under the Clinton
Administration in the 1990s, and the development of a multi-state
trading system for the oxides of nitrogen (NOx) to supplement
(and in fact "amend") the trading system for sulfur oxides created
by the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.48 Interestingly, in
both instances, those involved first thought that legislation would
be required, but then, when it proved difficult to reach legislative
consensus, EPA proceeded to act administratively. (Admittedly,
legislation was later enacted on brownfields but it largely codified
policies that had already been developed at the administrative
level,49 and an ill-advised D.C. Circuit decision struck down
EPA's attempt to "enact" the President's "Clear Skies" proposal
by administrative interpretation when Congress refused to pass
46 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined
the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2005).
47 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
48 See Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25162 (May 12, 2005).
49 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-18, 115 Stat. 2356 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)).
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Other examples of significant policy developments without
the benefit of legislation include: (1) the development of trading-
first in the "bubble" and "emissions offset interpretative ruling"
policies at EPA and only thereafter in the "acid rain trading"
program in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments; (2) risk-based
priority setting and risk assessment as symbolized by the 1987
"Unfinished Business" Report; (3) the EPA report on second-hand
tobacco smoke, which led to the single most important public
health improvement of our times-the change in our culture to
discourage smoking generally and particularly in public places; (4)
the reform of the Superfund program to encourage voluntary
clean-ups and "brownfields re-development"; (5) environmental
justice under the Clinton Administration; (6) the development over
the last three Administrations of Energy Star, performance track,
and other environmental programs that rely on positive incentives
in addition to punitive threats; and (7) the in silico revolution
currently in progress in which computer simulations, structure
activity relationships, and understanding of the biology of "toxicity
pathways" replace whole body testing in animals as the basis for
most decisions about the safety of chemicals.51
All of these fundamental changes-significant improvements,
I would contend-in environmental policy were accomplished
without the "benefit" of statutory amendments. The idea that
policy innovations in environmental law take shape first in the
minds of members of Congress, who then "write laws" requiring
administrators to "implement" far-seeing policy choices, is simply
a myth, at least in the modem environmental era in the United
States.
'o See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
51 COMMITTEE ON ToxicITY TESTING AND ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AGENTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ToxICITY TESTING IN THE 2 1 ST
CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY - REPORT IN BRIEF 2 (2007), available at
http://dels.nas.edu/dels/rptbriefs/Toxicity Testingfinal.pdf ("The report
envisions a new toxicity-testing system that relies mainly on understanding
'toxicity pathways'-the cellular response -pathways that can result in adverse
health effects when sufficiently perturbed. Such a system would evaluate
biologically significant alterations without relying on studies of whole
animals."); see also Bret C. Cohen et al., Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century:
Better Results, Less Use ofAnimals, 25 ENVTL. FORuM 46 (2008) (discussing the
viability of the National Academy of Science's report with regards to replacing
animal testing).
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The Chevron decision52 in 1984 brought a welcome, if not
long-overdue, note of realism to American legal theory by
recognizing that administrative agencies appropriately make law in
the interstices where Congress has not addressed a particular issue:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
There are, however, two separate "tests" at war with one
another in this crucial passage in the Chevron opinion. The
broader, more "functional" test is whether Congress focused on
and decided "the precise question at issue." The other, which is
the more literal, traditional and narrower reading, is whether the
.statutory language is "ambiguous."
As some wise observers predicted long ago,54 the rising tide
of "textualism" among judges has led some courts to confuse the
question of whether there is language in the statute that arguably
bears peripherally on the issue with the correct question under
Chevron of whether Congress actually "has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue." The underlying purposes behind
Chevron are to vindicate policy choices that Congress has actually
made while restricting lower courts from imposing their "own
construction" on the statute in the guise of interpreting a fictive
Congressional "intent" when Congress actually had no "intent" on
the "precise question at issue." 55 From this standpoint, it is fatuous
to assert (as does the D.C. Circuit in its recent decision striking
52 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
53 Id. at 843-44 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
14 Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 357-58 (1994).
55 Elliott, supra note 46, at 7-8.
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down the CAIR rule) that Congress has "spoken directly" to the
''precise question" of whether EPA may implement a "cap and
trade" system for the oxides of nitrogen. On the contrary, this is a
classic instance of an issue on which the statute is really "silent."
The fact that Congress included language in the statute providing
that a plant in one state could be forced to reduce its emissions if it
could be traced to causing a significant violation of air quality
standards in another other state56 does not in any realistic sense
mean that Congress "intended" to preclude a NOx trading system.
Congress in 1990 simply did not envision that EPA (both under
Clinton in 1998 and under Bush in 2005) might promulgate a
trading system for NOx to address region-wide nonattainment, as
opposed to non-attainment caused by an identifiable polluter.
For the "portage strategy" of administrative interpretation to
work effectively, courts have to give administrative agencies
flexibility to adapt statutes creatively to address questions that
Congress did not actually envision when enacting the statute.
EPA's recent Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on how
to address climate change under the existing Clean Air Act
provides numerous examples of creative interpretations that the
agency might adopt to regulate GHGs under the existing statute,57
as it was encouraged to do by the Mass. v. EPA decision. But
decisions like the D.C. Circuit's ill-advised North Carolina
opinion striking down the CAIR rule merely get in the way
without actually vindicating Congressional authority or enforcing
any policy decisions that Congress actually made.
It would be hard to imagine any environmental issue on which
there is a broader bipartisan consensus than that we need a national
trading system for NOx, as well as SO 2. Not only was such as
system promulgated by both the democratic Clinton
Administration in 1998 and the republican second Bush
Administration in 2005, but a trading system for NOx was also a
common feature of all the multi-pollutant bills pending in
Congress in the first half of the present decade. Those bills were
not enacted because the Republicans and Democrats could not
agree (or compromise) on whether the reductions under a NOx
56 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2000).
57 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,353, 44,407-14 (July 30, 2008).
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trading system should be 70% or 90%. But no one (with the
possible exception of three judges of the D.C. Circuit) believes that
the reductions should be 0%.
To make "portage strategies" work, judges should be less
intrusive on agency interpretations where Congress has been
inactive or unable to pass legislation, and judges should be
reluctant to find that Congress has "spoken directly to the precise
question at issue" based on scraps of statutory wording that were
never understood at the time to determine the issues now before
the court.
4. Develop Expert Consensus Recommendations and Present the
Politicians with a Pre-Packaged Compromise
The final option for "portage strategies" is to make political
compromises by politicians on legislation less central to policy
development by developing a consensus among experts that
already includes the key compromises bejore taking the issue to
Congress for political action. I will explore this option in more
detail at the end of this paper.
I should not be misunderstood as suggesting that any of these
first three "portage strategies" is ideal. On the contrary, all of
them are second or third best ways of making policy in an era in
which compromise legislation in the environmental field is not
easily attainable. The first three (local legislation, decisions by
courts, and creative interpretations of existing law by agencies) all
suffer from the common feature that only a small subset of the
policy options that would be available through legislation are
available in a "portage" solution that is a substitute for legislation.
For example, while EPA might be able to create a trading system
for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases under the existing
Clean Air Act if judges would back off and give the agency its
proper interpretative discretion under Chevron,58 EPA almost
58 See Is C02 a Pollutant and Does EPA Have the Power to Regulate It?:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat '1 Econ. Growth, Nat. Resources, and
Reg. Affairs of the House Comm. on Gov 't Reform and the Subcomm. on Energy
and Env't of the House Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong. 14-20 (1999) (testimony of
Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, EPA) (concluding that EPA had existing
authority to address climate change under the Clean Air Act); Jonathan B.
Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155
U. PA. L. REv. 1961, 1967 n.20 (2007); Steven D. Cook, EPA Can Use Clean Air
Act Authority To Establish Carbon Dioxide Program, BNA DAILY ENV'T
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certainly cannot auction off allowances, which many economists
consider the preferable option. Its authority is also constrained in
numerous other ways that make policy designed to address climate
change under existing law possible but less than optimal.
The fourth "portage strategy," expert consensus
recommendations to the legislature, does not, however, suffer from
that deficiency, but makes available the full panoply of options
that would otherwise be available to the legislature. It merely
reduces the potential for demagoguery and political posturing by
striking reasonable compromises before an issue is presented to the
legislature. For this reason, and also because this "portage
strategy" is less familiar to American lawyers than the other three,
I devote the balance of this paper to exploring it.
IV. EXPERT CONSENSUS PROPOSAL SYSTEMS
Most environmental problems are too complex and nuanced
to be addressed effectively by a politicized and generalist
Congress. Congress's function is not to devise solutions to
complex technocratic problems, but to provide democratic
guidance and legitimacy. Members of Congress quite properly
spend most of their time running for re-election, and addressing
other pressing issues such as the war on terrorism, medical care
and social security, whether the Bush tax cuts should be allowed to
lapse, and whether there is anything to be done to keep the
economy from slipping further into recession. Most members of
Congress simply do not have the time or inclination to understand
the details of complex environmental policy. Their staffs have a
somewhat deeper understanding of environmental issues, but still
in my experience not always at the same level of understanding as
the experts in the agencies or academia who have spent their
professional lives working on environmental issues, whereas many
staffers leave after two or three years for more lucrative jobs
elsewhere.
Complex and difficult environmental issues such as how to
define a wetland tend to get reduced to whether one is "for or
REPORT, Feb. 8, 2008, at A-5; Anthony Lacey, EPA Eyes NSR Rules for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Stationary Sources, InsideEPA.com, Aug. 13,
2007. This was of course the view of EPA's authority that was ultimately upheld
in Mass v. EPA.
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against" preserving wetlands; whether to make a 70% reduction in
mercury emissions from power plants via a trading system or via
95% technological controls gets translated into whether one is "for
or against" "tough controls" on mercury.
The United States Congress stands out internationally as one
of the few places where the task of developing and proposing
legislation on complex technical subjects is left to the legislators.
The situation is somewhat less problematic when an activist
executive branch is actively drafting and proposing legislation and
can call on the resources and expertise of the agencies.
One option for going around the Congressional "logjam" is to
build an ancillary institution with the time and expertise to hammer
out policy changes and present them to Congress for ratification,
rejection or fine-tuning. There are numerous examples of this
model in which a diverse group of experts puts together consensus
recommendations to legislatures.
For instance, some states have what they call Law Revision
Commissions59 that make recommendations for legislation to the
legislature. The model was also used successfully in the U.S. at
the federal level in the form of the Defense Base Realignment
Closure Commission, when Congress intentionally tied its own
hands to demagogue issues by setting up an expert panel to make
recommendations to close bases and providing that the
recommendations, if approved by the President, would go into
effect unless Congress passed a joint resolution of disapproval.6 °
The European Commission serves a somewhat similar
function in the European Union. The Commission experts have a
monopoly on the right to propose new legislation, but once a
package is proposed, the European Parliament and the Council
must ratify or amend it.61 This is not too different from the
59 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8280-8298 (Deering 2008); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 2-85 to -88 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 1:12A-1 to -15 (2008).
60 The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission was authorized
by Congress through the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.
Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§ 2901-2914, 104 Stat. 1485, 1808-19 (1990).
61 KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF CoMMuNITY LAW 45 (5th ed.
2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/publicationsbooklets/eudocumentation/
02/txt-en.pdf ("The Commission is first of all the 'driving force' behind
Community policy. It is the starting point for every Community action, as it is
the Commission that has to present proposals and drafts for Community
legislation to the Council (this is termed the Commission's right of initiative).").
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Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure under the federal
Rules Enabling Act62 (except that the ratifying bodies are both the
Supreme Court and Congress), or the idea behind the American
Law Institute's "Restatements" of the common law in various
areas, or the Administrative Conference of the United States,
which, until its abolition in 1995, made expert recommendations to
Congress for improving the administrative process.
63
In each of these "expert consensus proposal systems,"
managing change in a complex and highlytechnical legal system
is facilitated by expert advice and guidance in developing policy
packages that already contain the key compromises built into them.
Most of the important and difficult issues are worked out in
advance by a diverse group of experts who represent a diversity of
the interests, and then consensus proposals are presented on a
relatively non-controversial basis to the politicians for symbolic
ratification and perhaps a few modest tweaks. For example, after
almost five years of developing the REACH program at the expert
level, the European Commission transmitted its recommendation
to the European Parliament and the Council. These bodies
debated, deliberated and made a few changes, mainly to signal
symbolically that they favored economic development as well as
strong protection against chemicals. But the basic design of the
program was already hammered out and the crucial compromises
made before the program was presented to the legislature. This is
not too different from the American concept of "Negotiated
Rulemaking" in which a representative group of experts hammers
out a consensus proposal, which is then presented to the agency,
the public, and the courts for review and possible revisions, but is
usually adopted with few if any changes.64
62 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2000). See generally JAMES C. DUFF, THE
RULEMAKING PROCESS: A SUMMARY FOR THE BENCH AND BAR (2007), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/ruies/proceduresum.htm.
63 The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) was a federal
advisory agency that existed from 1968 to 1995. ACUS made over 300
recommendations on administrative procedure issues; over 200 of which were
enacted either by agencies or by Congress. The funding for ACUS was
eliminated by a House-Senate conference in 1995. See FLORIDA STATE
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, ABA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE DATABASE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2008).
64 Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2000); DAVID
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It is not always necessary that an expert consensus policy
proposal system must be created by statute or imbued with
exclusive statutory authority to make proposals. More informal
groups, such as the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP),
have been influential precisely because they bring together a
diverse group of expert stakeholders to agree on a consensus
proposal or set of principles.
The key feature that all these expert consensus policy
proposal systems have in common is that none of them relies
primarily on politicians to initiate the changes needed to adapt a
complex legal system to changing conditions. Rather, all these
systems recognize, at least implicitly, that politicians are too busy
doing what politicians do to master the complex details of policy
or to work out sensible compromises. Rather, politicians in
elective democracies will understandably be tempted to send
simple high-level signals to their constituencies that they are in
favor of economic development as well as tough regulation of
chemicals, or that they think wetlands are good and should be
protected, or that mercury from power plants is bad.
Perhaps one way around the logjam in Congress is for
environmental experts to reach consensus among themselves about
what policies make good sense and to present them as a package to
Congress.
M. PRITZKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK
1-17, 173-83 (1990). See generally Phillip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982) (arguing for the adoption of negotiated
rulemaking procedures and outlining how the process would work). For a
skeptical assessment, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise
and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (arguing
that "[n]egotiated rulemaking has long lacked systematic evidence showing that
it yields superior results over conventional rulemaking.").
65 "USCAP is an expanding alliance of major businesses and leading climate
and environmental groups that have come together to call on the federal
government to enact legislation requiring, significant reductions of greenhouse
gas emissions. After a year of dialogue and collaboration, the group produced a
set of principles and recommendations to guide the formulation of a regulated
economy-wide, market-driven approach to climate protection." UNITED STATES
CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, ABOUT Us, http://www.us-cap.org/about/
index.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2008).
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
20081
H inOnline -- 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 53 2008-2009
